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Abstract 
In Scandinavia, the provision of health care services has been, almost entirely, the 
responsibility of the public health care system. However, in the last five to seven years there 
has been remarkable growth in the private health care market. These health care services are 
obtained normally through insurance contracts. In this paper, I seek explanations for this 
phenomenon, using data from Norway. First, using available market data, I document that 
the market for private treatment insurance—often labelled as “jump the treatment queue 
insurance”—is growing rapidly. Thereafter, I present a theoretical model that identifies 
primary drivers for individual demand for treatment insurance. The third step is to analyse a 
unique survey data set that is combined with aggregate county data on treatment queues. The 
overall results indicate that public waiting lists affect the demand for privately bought 
insurance, while employer-provided insurance does not seem to be affected. I find strong 
preference for this type of insurance among smokers and the self-employed. Moreover, 
income is an important determinant of insurance demand. 
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1. Introduction 
During the last five to seven years, the growth in private health care provision has been 
high in all Scandinavian countries and most people acquired the right to private health care 
services through insurance contracts. This emerging trend is politically disputed. One reason for 
this is that the Nordic welfare states have typically aimed towards broad public welfare solutions 
in basic welfare areas such as health, schooling and ageing. Moreover, and even more 
importantly, the Nordic welfare model is based on a principle of universalism (Eriksson et al. 
1987); i.e., that all citizens should be provided the most fundamental welfare services irrespective 
of income, working sector or family background. Thus, for some, private treatment insurance is 
considered an “ugly duckling” in the Nordic nest because it creates inequalities in welfare services 
that depend on income or other socio-economic characteristics. Based on this, more 
understanding of the current trend in private treatment insurance is required. 
In this paper, I utilize information from a representative Norwegian survey data set that is 
combined with available public data on waiting times. I investigate how the role of queues in the 
public health care system along with other important socio-economic variables affects the 
demand for private treatment insurance.2 The data set has been obtained from one of the largest 
Nordic suppliers of insurance and it consist of approximately 1800 individuals between 30 to 55 
years—the prime target group for private treatment insurance. The survey carries information 
about SES characteristics and their self-reported insurance coverage. The treatment insurance 
product that is explored here is often labelled as “jump the queue” cover. A person who 
possesses this insurance can utilize it in the case of a need for specialist medical services or for 
basic surgery.3 
According to Kildal and Kuhnle (2005), the Nordic principle of universalism implies, 
among other things, that each citizen has the right to free health care services without any form 
of means testing. For this reason, private health care provision has historically only played a 
marginal role within the Nordic countries. However, free health care for all comes at a cost; 
namely, that in some health areas treatment queues appear and this might be one explanation for 
                                                 
2 Throughout this paper, the label “treatment insurance” will be used. This insurance gives the holder a right to 
indemnity if medical treatment is necessary—given that treatment is possible. The broader notion of health insurance 
may also cover payouts that are not necessarily connected to treatments. For example, a broad health insurance can 
trigger payouts for an untreatable illness. The latter type of insurance is not analysed in this paper. 
3 Normally a person who incurs a very serious illness (such as cancer or heart attack etc.) will be treated immediately 
at a public hospital. Therefore, treatment insurance is normally used to fix non-life threatening illnesses and for 
getting faster access to a medical specialist.  
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the rapid growth in private treatment. Interestingly, to the best of my knowledge, no such study 
has been conducted on Scandinavian data;4 only Besley et al. (1999), using UK survey data, have 
investigated the relationship between queues in public health care and the demand for treatment 
insurance. Therefore, this paper fills a void in the literature by focusing on non-UK data. 
The main results are as follows: for private ownership of treatment insurance, I find a 
quite robust association between queues measured at the county level and demand. This result is 
in accordance with Besley et al. (1999). However, for employer-provided insurance, I cannot find 
any such association. A possible explanation for the latter observation is that firms typically 
operate across county borders and are therefore less sensitive to county-specific treatment 
queues. 
I find that smoking status is important in explaining the interest, the intention to buy and 
possession of treatment insurance. Smokers are more likely to possess both privately bought and 
employer-provided insurance and they are more likely to express higher interest in buying 
treatment insurance. This may be considered as a surprising result. It is common knowledge that 
smoking leads to serious illnesses such as lung cancer, stroke and heart disease. It is also common 
knowledge that these acute conditions will always be treated immediately at a public hospital, and 
several studies have also confirmed that smokers are less risk averse than non-smokers (Barsky et 
al. 1997; Aarbu and Schroyen 2009). 
Thus, the association between smoking and preference for treatment insurance is not 
obvious at first sight. However, there may be other milder and more unknown smoking-related 
sickness conditions (for example, arteriosclerosis) where treatment capacity is low. This may spur 
demand among smokers. Second, Smith et al. (2001) find that smokers assign a larger risk 
towards not living until 75 after a smoking-related health shock than non-smokers do. Thus, it 
might be that smokers on average hold a higher subjective probability for the need of treatment 
than non-smokers. Third, Viscusi and Hersch (2001) document that smokers select riskier jobs 
and are injured more often—both at work and at home—than non-smokers. Hence, a higher 
injury probability among smokers is consistent with an elevated preference for treatment 
insurance. 
Income is an important determinant of demand and the higher the income, the higher the 
demand for treatment insurance. This finding corresponds closely with the findings in Besley et 
al. (1999). Moreover, self-employed respondents express significantly higher intention to buy 
treatment insurance than wage earners, which is consistent with the fact that welfare benefits for 
                                                 
4 However, Iversen (1997), Hoel and Sæther (2003) and Marchand and Schroyen (2005) provide a theoretical 
discussion within a context that mirrors the Nordic environment. 
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the self-employed in Norway are inferior compared with standard employee benefits. For 
example, an employee in Norway is compensated fully for the first 16 days of a sickness spell. 
This rule does not apply to the self-employed. They are required to buy additional insurance 
cover in order to obtain compensation. The bottom line is that the economic loss from a sickness 
spell for a self-employed person will be considerably larger than for employees under the current 
welfare system. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I link the most relevant literature within 
this field to the findings presented here. Section 3 presents descriptive information about the 
main characteristics of the Norwegian public health care system. In Section 4, the small and 
immature treatment insurance market in Norway is described in more detail. Section 5 sets up a 
theoretical model for the willingness to pay for treatment insurance. Section 6 provides 
descriptive information about the data set, and in Section 7, empirical results are presented. First, 
the interest for this particular product is analysed. Thereafter, I apply the theoretical model 
derived in Section 4 to the data. Finally, the possession of treatment insurance is analysed. 
Section 8 provides a discussion of the empirical results. Section 9 concludes. 
2. Main findings of previous studies 
In the model of Barzel (1974), individuals form a queue in order to gain the right to a 
public good. Those with lower time costs stay longer in the queue and for the marginal person in 
the queue the value of the good is matched exactly by the time cost used in the queue. In the 
particular case I am looking into, the queues formed in the health care system can be seen as a 
rationing device for a free public good. When queues differ across counties—as they do in 
Norway—there will be different time costs for individuals dependent on their place of residence. 
This implies that the valuation of substitutes of the free public good differs across counties. 
Hence, the demand for treatment insurance should be related positively to county-specific 
queues. In counties with long queues, the time cost will be higher and a greater number of people 
will search for substitutes if these are available.5 The composition of the queue is not random. 
For example, high-income individuals are more likely to opt out of the queue and into private 
alternatives because of the higher time costs they face. 
By linking county-specific waiting-time variables to the survey data set, I am able to show 
that queues affect individual insurance demand. Moreover, as found in Besley et al. (1999), I find 
that high-income individuals are more likely to demand this insurance. Contrary to their analysis, 
                                                 
5 Queues can also differ between counties if there are differences across counties in health conditions. I am not 
aware of any studies, however, that document this possibility. 
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however, I find that higher education lowers the demand. I discuss reasons for this difference in 
Section 8. 
As I referred to above, higher demand for this insurance among smokers is not obvious 
because one can imagine, for example, that risk aversion is lower among smokers, which should 
actually lead to a lower preference. On the other hand, however, at least three quite recent studies 
indicate that there are differences between smokers and non-smokers that give support to the 
finding here. Smith et al. (2001) analyse a panel of respondents in the US Health and Retirement 
Study. By utilizing a longitudinal data set, the researchers were able to identify respondents who 
experienced different health shocks.6 First, they found that smokers overall are more pessimistic 
than non-smokers of survival until aged 75. Moreover, they also documented that smokers 
reacted to smoking-related health shocks, while they did not react to health shocks that were 
caused by more general health problems (that are not particular to smoking). Viscusi and Hersch 
(2001), find that smokers hurt themselves more—both at home and at work— compared to non-
smokers. Thus, these studies suggest that the probability of adverse health outcomes is greater 
for smokers than for non-smokers. Moreover, in Lundborg (2007)—who utilizes Swedish 
administrative register data—it is documented that sickness absence for smokers is significantly 
higher than the average sickness absence. He also uncovers that smokers are more likely to report 
more chronic diseases and more likely to report poor health. This observation square with a 
higher preference for treatment insurance, which I find in this paper. 
The other main results this study provides are consistent with earlier theoretical literature 
on this subject. For example, that the desirability of this insurance increases with income is 
consistent with Besley and Coate (1991) and Marchand and Schroyen (2005).7  
3. The provision of public health care in Norway 
Public health care at zero cost for the user is a mainstay in the Nordic welfare model, and 
Norway is no exception. Health care is financed through general taxation and nobody asks for 
your insurance papers if you become sick. Each citizen is linked to a permanent medical doctor 
                                                 
6 Smith et al. (2001) defines a health condition as “the onset of new, serious health conditions”; for example, heart 
attacks and other cardiovascular diseases or cancer. 
7 A third category of literature that is of more direct relevance to this study is the evolving empirical literature on 
selection problems in insurance. This literature takes advantage of large micro data sets on insurance contracts. The 
state of the art approach is to use such data in order to search for positive correlation between claims and insurance 
cover, conditional on the variables used in tariff setting (Finkelstein and Poterba 2006, Finkelstein and McGarry 
2006, Finkelstein and Poterba 2004).7 However, because of the immaturity of the particular market studied here, I do 
not have access to insurance contracts and this question is therefore left open for future research. 
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who is authorized to make referrals and the referral is a ticket into the public health care system. 
While consultations with the permanent doctor are highly accessible (normally within a couple of 
days), additional services in the health care system can involve weeks or months of waiting.8 The 
treatment insurance that is considered in this paper can be invoked from the day the patient is 
given a referral from his/her permanent doctor. Thus, having treatment insurance cannot 
circumvent queues in the primary health care system, but rather applies to hospitalization and 
specialist medical services. 
The main problem with this welfare model is that it can take some time before treatment 
is provided—if a medical expert considers waiting justifiable. Therefore, one has to wait or, 
alternatively, one can acquire private treatment insurance that guarantees treatment within a given 
period. As shown in Table 1, waiting times in Norway are not insignificant. 
 
………………………………………TABLE 1……………………………………. 
 
Table 1 reveals that, on average, people have to wait around three months before 
treatment is provided. Moreover, note that there is considerable variation between counties and 
long waiting times is more pronounced in the western and northern parts of Norway.9  
To prevent the negative tendency towards longer waiting lists, the authorities introduced 
free hospital choice in May 2003, which implied that each citizen could choose the treatment 
place regardless of residence. In theory, this change should lead to equal waiting times across 
counties and thereby neutralize any regional demand effects of treatment insurance. Although the 
table shows that waiting times on average have fallen considerably from 1998 to 2005, there are 
still differences in waiting times between health regions. The lack of convergence in waiting times 
may be explained by home bias; for example, the social discomfort of being away from family 
and friends when treated is costly both for the treated and for the family. Norway’s geography 
                                                 
8 Cases where people have waited more than a year are not uncommon and one can easily count the number of 
people on long-term waiting lists using data from the Norwegian Patient Register (www.npr.no). 
9 Public health care is provided by five regional state-owned entities: EastNorway, SouthNorway, WestNorway, 
MidNorway and NorthNorway. Each region has one major hospital and several smaller specialized hospitals. 
Typically, intensive care and the most resource-demanding care are located in the major hospital within each region, 
while milder conditions are treated in the smaller hospitals. One reason for longer waiting times in west and north 
Norway might be longer travel distances to alternative hospitals. Monstad et.al. (2006) confirms that travel distance 
is, indeed, significant for hospital choices. 
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supports this observation because of its length (around 2500 km), and it is costly to travel both in 
terms of time and money.10 
4. Private treatment insurance in Norway 
As underlined in the introduction, the treatment insurance market analysed here is small 
and immature but is currently growing at double-digit rates. The growth in the market over the 
last couple of years stems almost entirely from employer-provided insurance, as shown in the 
figure below. 
 
…………………………………DIAGRAM 1………………………………. 
 
This figure draws on reports provided from insurers to the Financial Services Association 
(FNH). In addition to the numbers from FNH, I have also added an estimate on the number of 
insured from the one important insurer that is not a member of FNH. This insurer occasionally 
reports numbers of insured in interviews in the press. Numbers are available for the fall of 2004, 
the fall of 2006, the fall of 2007 and at the end of 2008. For the missing periods, the numbers are 
imputed.11 The most interesting pattern is the growth in employer-provided insurance. In 2004, 
employer-provided insurance constituted around 65 per cent of the market; the share today is 
around 85 per cent. 
The traditional providers, who are members of FNH, offer pure private treatment 
insurance. In this case, the policy-holder is guaranteed a slot in the private health care system 
within a time limit, usually within 28 days after the treatment decision given by the primary 
doctor. 
The other large insurance player offers a product that utilizes the option of free hospital 
choice in a rather innovative way. When a claim is reported, this insurance provider first searches 
the public hospitals for vacant treatment capacity. If there is a vacant slot, the customer is offered 
that slot, and will be treated at a public hospital free of charge. The contract is designed such that 
the insured must accept that slot, regardless of where the treatment is provided. The cost to the 
insurance provider is in this case only the administrative costs connected with the search process. 
                                                 
10 The National Health Service pays the travel costs if one chooses a hospital in a county other than the resident 
county. Thus, the only cost the patient bears is travel time and possibly uncertainties about the quality of treatment 
given in another county. 
11 If I only observe tz  and 3+tz , then 1+tz  is imputed as )(3
1
31 tttt zzzz −+= ++ . 
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However, if the provider does not succeed in finding a vacant slot in the public system 
within a time limit that is specified in the contract, then the customer is channelled to a private 
hospital. Thus, the exercise of the private insurance option is conditional upon the lack of public 
treatment slots. The implication of this business practice is to lower the risk for the insurance 
provider. When public slots are abundant, the likelihood of exercising the option is low and costs 
for the provider are low. Therefore, the prices offered to the customers are dependent on the 
time limit for the search—specified in the contract, which currently can be 10, 20 or 30 days. The 
longer the search time specified in the contract, the lower the price of the insurance. The most 
important material difference between this insurer and the other more traditional insurers might 
be connected to underwriting; it is reasonable to believe that the risk for the untraditional 
insurance player is lower, and tolerance for possible information problems may therefore be 
higher. The scarcity of information at hand seems to confirm that the untraditional player 
requires less health information than the other providers. 
5. Demand for private treatment insurance: a waiting time model 
One important reason for opting into the private treatment insurance market is to avoid 
the possibility of waiting. Waiting time is a factor that reduces the quality of the public health care 
system, but on the other hand, it can also act as a screening device. Besley et al. (1999) show that 
such screening might imply sorting by income. In their model, high-income individuals choose 
private insurance while low-income people choose the public system. This result is driven by two 
main assumptions: a) the quality of health care is a normal good, and b) individuals are risk 
averse. I maintain these assumptions here. 
Using a somewhat different model, Marchand and Schroyen (2005) show a similar sorting 
result between public and private health care, but with ability instead of income and waiting time 
instead of quality of treatment.12 
Below I present a rather simple theoretical model, inspired by the Marchand and 
Schroyen approach. The aim of this theoretical discussion is to develop guidelines for the 
empirics that are presented later in the paper. 
When people are asked about their possession of treatment insurance or asked about 
their preference for treatment insurance it makes sense to assume that the preference for this 
insurance reflects the perceived probability of requiring health care services. Denote this 
                                                 
12 Ability can here be understood as the income-generating potential. People with high ability will normally receive 
higher hourly wages, meaning that the income loss per hour if sick is higher for high ability persons than for others. 
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probability as iπ .
13 Following the idea of Marchand and Schroyen, let iT  be total time available 
for the individual. To keep things as simple as possible, denote ic  as consumption and ie  as 
health expenditure paid out of pocket if the person becomes ill.14 If sick, the time available is 
ii wT − , where iw  can be interpreted as waiting time in the public health care system. Moreover, 
during the sickness period, the person needs to allocate resources towards treatment expenses. 
This reduces expenditure possibilities for other goods; hence, available consumption on other 
goods is ii ec − . Assume that the individual is active in the labour market and that he/she can 
choose freely between leisure ( il ) and consumption. Furthermore, let ia  denote the hourly wage 
and im  financial wealth. The maximization problem for this person can then be set up as follows. 
If healthy with probability ( iπ−1 ): 
).,(utilityIndirect :
      
),(   max
iiii
c
il
iiii
ii
mTaava
u
u
FOC
mTalacst
lcu
i
+=→=
+=+  
If ill with probability iπ : 
).)(,(utilityIndirect  :
)(      
),(   max
iiiiiii
c
l
iiiiii
ii
emwTaava
u
u
FOC
emwTalacst
lcu
i
i −+−=→=
−+−=+  
 
The expected utility for an uninsured individual is then (I suppress the subscript i from here 
onwards) 
 
(1) ),()1())(,( maTavemwTaavEv +−+−+−= ππ . 
 
Using a second-order Taylor expansion around maT + , one obtains (see Appendix 1) 
 
 
                                                 
13 It is likely that this probability is formed by a subjective assessment that among others includes health status ( iH ) 
and possibly other personal characteristics ( iA ), implying that the probability of treatment may be written as 
),( iii AHπ . However, to keep the model as simple as possible, I abstract from this possible extension here. 
14 In this highly stylized setting, ie  can be thought of as co-payments using the public health care system. 
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(2) 2)(
2
1)(),( eawveawvmaTavEv mmmNI +++−+≈ ππ . 
Let P be the insurance premium for one unit of treatment insurance. If the person is insured, the 
utility will be equal across states of the world and one can simply write the expected utility as15 
 
(3) ),( PmaTavEv −+= . 
 
Taking a first-order Taylor expansion around ),( maTa + , we obtain (see Appendix 1) 
 
(4) PvmaTavEv mI −+= ),( . 
 
The individual will demand insurance if and only if the expected utility when insured is greater or 
equal to the expected utility when not insured. Let *P  be the price that makes the individual 
indifferent between having insurance versus not having insurance, i.e., INI EvEv ≅ . This leads to 
the following equality: 
 
(5) 
,
)(
2
),(
)()(
2
1)(
                          
)(
2
1)(),(),(
22*
2*
m
mm
a
a
m
mm
mmmm
v
v
R
eawmaTaReaweaw
v
veawP
eawveawvmaTavPvmaTav
−=
++++=+−+=
⇓
+++−+=−+
ππππ
ππ
, 
 
where 
m
mm
a v
vR −=  denotes the degree of absolute risk aversion. The first term in (5) reflects the 
expected cost of sickness. This cost consists of the cost of waiting (aw) and health expenditures 
(e). The second term represents the variance in earnings and if the person is risk averse (a 
preference for low variance) – this term is positive.  
The derivatives of (5) with respect to the waiting time, financial wealth and wage are 
                                                 
15 Note that this assumption implies that waiting time is zero if the person is insured. The insurance contracts 
available today typically restrict the waiting time to a maximum of 28 days before treatment is started. Thus, an 
insured person will typically expect a non-zero waiting time but this non-zero waiting time is still lower than the 
waiting time an uninsured person faces. 
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where L is labour supply. 
The derivative of the premium with respect to waiting time is greater than zero. 
Moreover, the higher the wage, the higher the sickness probability, and the higher the risk 
aversion, the larger is this derivative. Furthermore, the premium a person is willing to pay 
decreases in wealth if absolute risk aversion decreases in wealth. 
The derivative of *P  with respect to wage is derived in Appendix 1. It is shown there that 
it is most likely positive. The main intuition is that a wage increase leads to both a higher mean 
loss and higher variance in income if the person needs treatment. The increase in mean loss is 
wπ  and the increase in variance is )( eawwπ + , which is weighted by the risk aversion coefficient. 
These effects are unanimously positive. The second term, however, is probably negative because 
risk aversion most likely declines when the hourly wage increases. However, because this is a 
second-order effect, 
a
P
∂
∂ *  is most likely greater than zero. 
The above equations state the demand for treatment insurance increases in risk aversion, 
waiting lists and – most likely - the wage. Although it is of great interest to look closer into the 
connection between co-payments (e) and the use of private alternatives to public health, one 
needs access to time series data to do this. This is left for future research. 
6. Data and descriptive statistics 
In December 2004, a Nordic insurance company conducted a broad survey on the 
possession of treatment insurance in Norway. The survey gathered information from a broad 
national web panel owned by the poll company Synovate. The response rate was 49.2 per cent. 
The respondents answered the survey by clicking on a link sent to them by email. It was revealed 
from the start that the survey was conducted for an insurance company. Internet penetration is 
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especially high in the Nordic countries and this survey is considered nationally representative for 
respondents between 30–55 years.16 
The survey was designed in a way that allows for testing consistencies in answers. This is 
important because survey answers might have biases that occur from random answering and 
uninterested respondents. Moreover, insurance is regarded normally as a “low-interest product”. 
In particular, this implies that respondents do not always know exactly what type of insurances 
they have, which enhances the need for consistency testing. The survey started with questions 
regarding knowledge of the product, together with a question about smoking. Because treatment 
insurance is quite rare, the respondent was asked two times about possession of insurance. The 
first question did not contain any description of this insurance, while the the second question 
gave a detailed specification of the insurance cover. Only respondents that answered consistently 
on both questions were kept. Table 2 provides the number of observations divided into the three 
relevant categories: no insurance, privately bought and insurance through employer. Around 400 
respondents fell out of the sample following the consistency check and the effective sample 
contains approximately 1800 respondents. 
 
……..………………………………TABLE 2………………………………….. 
 
Table 2 shows that treatment insurance is quite rare, as expected. Moreover, the fraction 
of those who own privately bought insurance is lower than the fraction who own employer-
provided insurance. This is in line with the pattern shown in Diagram 1. Table 3 breaks down the 
ownership pattern across socio-economic characteristics. 
 
…………………………………..TABLE 3…………………………………….. 
 
The fraction of smokers among those who have received treatment insurance through 
their employer is remarkably high compared with the sporadic- and non-smokers. Note also the 
positive difference between smokers and non-smokers among those who have obtained private 
treatment insurance. In order to verify that this finding is not an artefact of this particular sample, 
I confirmed that the fraction of smokers in the sample is comparable with public figures. The 
                                                 
16 According to the OECD (2005), more than six out of 10 households have Internet access in Norway. Only Korea, 
Iceland, Denmark and Switzerland surpass this figure. Internet penetration is lowest among the oldest and those with 
low household income (Statistics Norway, http://www.ssb.no/ikthus/tab-2005-11-16-02.html). 
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sample fraction of 25 per cent is very close to the official number provided by Statistics Norway: 
26 per cent in 2004 and 25 per cent in 2005.17 
Furthermore, note that insurance penetration increases with income and that the people 
with higher education are less likely to possess treatment insurance. There is a non-linear 
relationship between insurance possession and age for privately purchased treatment insurance. 
The likelihood is highest in the middle groups, from aged 35 to 45, while the likelihood is lower 
in the age groups from 45. The penetration of employer provided insurance is slightly decreasing 
in age. 
7. Empirical analysis 
The survey contains three sources of information that can be used to explain the 
underlying demand for this type of insurance: a) an interest question, b) an insurance tariff test, 
and c) possession of treatment insurance. Both the interest question and the insurance tariff test 
provide information about the heterogeneity in the latent utility of treatment insurance, while 
self-reported ownership of treatment insurance represents real demand. 
I start the analysis by examining the interest question and then proceed to the insurance 
tariff test. Finally, results from insurance ownership regressions are presented. By doing this 
three-step exploration of the data I try to uncover consistent demand patterns. First, however, I 
provide a description of the covariates used in the analysis. 
 
Covariates 
I use the same set of covariates in all empirical applications. Two waiting list variables are 
included. The first is the number of referrals pending on a waiting list divided by the county 
population. Only referrals that have pended for more than three months are included to remove 
possible noise from the referrals that are exercised within days or weeks after the referral is 
written. These short-term referrals can hardly be said to pose a waiting list problem. The other 
waiting list variable is mean waiting time in days for completed cases, given that these cases have 
pended for more than three months (thus at least 90 days). This variable also captures the effects 
of supply constraints at hospitals and it gives a direct estimate of the average time spent in 
queues. In order to capture the persistent effects of waiting lists, these two variables are measured 
as the mean over the period 1998–2001. Recall that the survey was conducted in 2004. By leaving 
                                                 
17 The estimate from Statistics Norway consists of people between ages 16 to 74. For the age group 25–54, Statistics 
Norway reports a figure of 27.7 per cent, which is somewhat higher than the sample percentage. 
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out the years prior to 2004, I also avoid possible simultaneity bias.18 Finally, I restrict these 
waiting list variables to include only somatic treatment as most of these illnesses quite easily can 
be treated through private alternatives. A further elaboration of the waiting list variables is given 
in Appendix 2. It is important to note that the waiting list variables vary only across, not within, 
counties. This can be regarded as assuming that subjects belonging to a specific county face the 
same waiting list problem. Thus, any heterogeneity with respect to waiting time within the county 
is therefore not addressed in the analysis. 
In addition to the waiting list variable, all specifications includes socio-economic 
characteristics such as  a gender dummy, three income category dummies, four age category 
dummies, a dummy for college/university education, a blue-collar dummy and whether the 
respondent is a non-smoker, sporadic smoker or a daily smoker. 
 
a) Interest in treatment insurance 
This question started with the following description. 
 
“Imagine that the following insurance is introduced in the Norwegian market: the insurance 
covers day surgery at a private hospital (not overnight stay) and it also covers all travel and 
possible accommodation costs that may occur as a consequence of the surgery. Given that the 
price for this insurance is acceptable, would this insurance be “Highly interesting”, “Interesting”, 
“Somewhat interesting”, or “Not interesting”? 
The structure of this question calls for an ordered probit/logit model, because of the 
natural ordering from low to high interest.19 The notion of an “acceptable price” may of course 
vary across respondents. 
Assume an underlying latent model. Let y* denote the unobserved latent variable of 
interest, which represents the latent utility of treatment insurance.20 Furthermore, assume that y* 
generally can be written as 
 
(6) eXy += '* β , 
 
                                                 
18 Whether one uses the period from 1998 to 2001 or 1998 to 2003 does not alter the results significantly. 
19 The respondents were also given the option “Do not know/do not want to answer” and the respondents who 
chose this option were not included in the analysis. An alternative could be to include the “uncertain” respondents in 
the “Not interesting” group. I have tried the latter alternative. This did not change the results significantly. 
20 In order to keep notation as simple as possible, I suppress the use of index i for individual i. 
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where the X-vector represents individual and county variables that have an effect on insurance 
demand and β is a column vector of parameters. Moreover, assume that the zero mean residual u 
is uncorrelated with X. 
Four responses are observed. These are: 1=y  – “Highly interesting”, 2=y  – 
“Interesting”, 3=y  – “Somewhat interesting” and 4=y  – “Not interesting”. Assume now that 
the residual is normally distributed and that there are three unknown cut-off points: that is, 
321 ααα << . Modelling the responses in order from lowest interest (4) to highest interest (1) 
implies that the probability of 4=y  is 
)'(Φ)'()'()()4( 1111
* XβαXβαePαeXβPαyPyP −=−<=<+=<== , where Φ  denotes 
the normal cumulative distribution. Likewise, the probability of observing response 3=y  is 
)'(Φ)'(Φ 12 XβαXβα −−− , the response 2=y  is )'(Φ)'(Φ 23 XβαXβα −−−  and the 
response 1=y  is )'(Φ1 3 Xβα −− . Because the responses are cumulated, an underlying 
assumption is a common β  for all responses. This means that we restrict the model so that the 
effect of a covariate is the same for each cut-off point, which may be denoted as an equal slopes 
assumption. Table 4 presents regression results as well as a test for the equal slopes assumption. 
 
….……………………………….TABLE 4…………………………………… 
 
The waiting list variable, referrals as a fraction of the county population, is indeed positive 
and statistically significant. Its marginal effect indicates that a one per cent increase in this 
variable increases the chances of expressing the highest interest by 0.4 per cent. The other waiting 
list variable, reflecting mean waiting time in days, is insignificant and close to zero. Moreover, 
note that daily smokers are more interested in this insurance than non-smokers. Furthermore, 
sporadic smokers are more interested; however, the point estimate is not statistically significant. 
One can also note that interest increases with income and the self-employed are significantly 
more interested in this type of insurance than employees are. Respondents with university 
education are significantly less interested than lower-educated people. Finally, the score test 
confirms the null hypothesis of equal slopes. 
 
b) The insurance tariff test 
After the interest test, respondents completed the insurance tariff test. Those who were 
not interested in insurance were not given the test. The results from the insurance tariff test are 
therefore conditional on a population that has at least some interest in this type of insurance. 
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This restriction might induce selection bias and it is therefore important to compare the results 
from the interest question (a question posed to the full sample) with the results from the 
insurance tariff test in order to judge the possible magnitude of this possible bias. 
The respondents were presented with a price that was calculated according to age and 
smoking habit (the respondent was unaware of this). Smokers were offered a price equal to 1.25 
times the non-smoking price irrespective of age. Sporadic smokers got the same price as non-
smokers. Prices increased with age. For example, the price for a 50-year-old person was 2.2 times 
the price quoted for a person between 30 and 35. According to the product specialists in the 
insurance company, this price set-up reflected the price structure in the individual market at the 
time of the survey. 
It is important to stress that each respondent was given only one price, which was the 
tariff price for this respondent. Thus, the respondents had no knowledge about the underlying 
tariff structure and the response is therefore only dependent on the respondent characteristics 
and the price each respondent was offered. Moreover, the respondents did not have any 
knowledge that they received different prices. Thus, any noise that one would expect to be 
present if the respondents knew they were treated differently can be disregarded. However, the 
insurance tariff structure causes problems with collinearity and restricts the possibility of 
identifying the effect of age on demand, an issue I will address later on.21 
After a detailed explanation of the insurance cover (a description is given above), the 
exact formulation of the question that included the insurance tariff was 
 
“If you were offered this insurance, would you be “highly likely”, “likely”, “somewhat unlikely” 
or “not likely at all” to buy if the price was P?” 
 
where P = f (age group, smoking habit) and where “highly likely” was coded as 1, “likely” as 2, 
“somewhat likely” as 3 and “not likely at all” as 4. 
 
In the choice situation, the respondent considers the utility of the insurance in two 
hypothetical situations—the situation with insurance and the situation without insurance. This 
situation was analysed theoretically in Section 5 and to empirically investigate this choice 
situation, I will depart from the expression of the willingness to pay given in equation (5). By a 
                                                 
21 The ideal set-up would be random insurance prices. However, the data contain no such test. 
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slight reformulation of (5), the latent utility of having the insurance ( *U ) can generally be written 
as 
 
(7) PeawmaTaReawU a −++++= 2* )(
2
),()( ππ . 
 
The first two terms on the right-hand side consist of the subjective probability of needing 
treatment, waiting time and individual risk aversion. I assume that this term, which includes both 
observable and unobservable factors, can be represented by a set of explanatory variables and an 
error term. That is, it can be written as *' εXβ + , where *ε  is a normally distributed error term 
with constant variance 2σ . Moreover, I assume that *ε  is independent of the explanatory 
variables X. Under these assumptions the latent utility function can be written as 
 
(8) ** ' εXβPU ++−= . 
 
Note that the price term enters the latent utility function as an additive term. This is 
consistent with an assumption of CARA utility.22 This assumption is often used in empirical work 
(see Einav et al. 2009). As Einav et al. (2009) point out; the CARA assumption is attractive 
because a change in the premium is independent of risk aversion and outcome probabilities. 
The underlying continuous utility function given in equation (8) cannot be observed, only 
the choices that express the likelihood of buying the insurance. The respondent expresses a very 
strong intention to buy if the choice is “Highly likely” (HL). The intention to buy is moderately 
strong for the response “Likely” (L), it is weak for the option “Unlikely” (UL) and it is very weak 
for the choice “Not likely at all” (NL). The responses are ordered naturally from weak to strong 
preferences. An ordered probit or logit model is appropriate for modelling the choices and 
because of the assumption of a normally distributed *ε , an ordered probit model is suitable. 
Note that the model does not contain any information about the scaling of the underlying 
latent variable *U . It is, therefore, not possible to identify both a unique variance (scale) and a 
unique vector or parameters. One alternative is to estimate equation (8) directly by fixing the 
parameter value of P equal to 1 and allow the variance 2σ  to be estimated freely. Another 
                                                 
22 A typical CARA utility function can be expressed as mev α−−= . With insurance, the utility can be written as 
)( Pmev −−−= α . Without insurance, the utility is mev α−−= . Note that the risk aversion is constant and equal to α  
irrespective of the insurance choice. See Gollier (2001) page 27 for a detailed description of CARA preferences. 
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alternative is to fix the variance equal to 1 and include P as an explanatory variable in the X 
vector (see for example Greene and Hensher (2008), page 9). In Appendix 3, I show the results 
from the first alternative. 
In the following, however, I apply the traditional approach, which is to fix the variance 
equal to 1 and include P as a standard explanatory variable. This means that I proceed from a 
rescaled latent model εXbPκU ++−= ' , where ε  now has a variance of 1, 
σ
κ 1= , 
σ
βb = . 
Assume that there are three unknown thresholds that separate the underlying latent utility 
categories. A very weak intention to buy implies that 1tU < , a weak intention implies that 
12 tUt ≥> , a strong intention implies that 23 tUt ≥> , and a very strong buying intention implies 
that 3tU ≥ . To complete the model, let y represent the responses to the insurance tariff test, 
where ),,,( HLLULNLy∈ . Then, one has the following possible response probabilities: 
 
).'(Φ1)'()()(
),'(Φ)'(Φ)''()()(
),'(Φ)'(Φ)''()()(
),'(Φ)'()()(
333
233223
122112
111
XbPκtXbPκtεPtUPHLyP
XbPκtXbPκtXbPκtεXbPκtPtUtPLyP
XbPκtXbPκtXbPκtεXbPκtPtUtPULyP
XbPκtXbPκtεPtUPNLyP
−+−=−+≥=≥==
−+−−+=−+<≤−+=≥>==
−+−−+=−+<≤−+=≥>==
−+=−+<=<==
 
By using these probabilities, one can form the likelihood function and obtain the 
maximum likelihood estimates of b  and κ . 
The explanatory variables are the same as those used in the interest regression (see Table 
4). It is, however, important to recall that the price was a function of age and smoking.23 This fact 
limits the identification of age effects because of collinearity. Using three age dummies is not 
possible because of perfect collinearity. I therefore define only two age dummies: one dummy for 
the group aged 40–45 and one for the group aged 45–54. Thus, the reference group is 
respondents below the age of 40. The smoking effect, however, is easier to identify because 
prices for smokers, sporadic smokers and non-smokers varies across age categories. A potential 
concern is a clear association between smoking and age. Fortunately, a formal statistical chi-
                                                 
23 Note that the latent utility model in (8) suggests a squared term for the waiting list variable. I have tried a 
specification where a squared waiting list is included. This turned out to be generally insignificant and inclusion of 
this variable does not alter the other results. 
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square test of this possible association confirms the null hypothesis of no association (chi-square 
value 2.26, p value 0.68).24 
In general, collinearity does not lead to biased estimates, but it can lead to severe 
problems such as high variance and unstable estimates (Greene 2000, page 256). To address the 
magnitude of the potential problem I choose to estimate the model with two, one and zero age 
covariates. Dropping age from the model, however, is a bad strategy if theory predicts that it 
should be included in the model. However, as noted above, the model (8) provides significant 
flexibility for the type of factors that have an impact on insurance demand and a model without 
age can in principle be equally theoretically valid as a model with age. Irrespective of this, 
however, a comparison of the parameter estimates across the models shows that 
inclusion/exclusion of age controls only have minor effects on the other estimates.25 
The maximum likelihood estimates are given in Table 5. Column 1 contains a model with 
two age dummies, column 2 with one age dummy and column 3 with zero age dummies.26 
 
……………………………………TABLE 5…………………………………… 
 
Considering the parameter estimates, I find that the major relationships are the same as 
those in the interest regression. Smokers and the self-employed express strong preferences for 
treatment insurance, while university-educated respondents express very weak preferences. On 
average, people with high incomes have a higher preference for the insurance, a result that is also 
found in the interest regression. 
Waiting lists affect the demand positively, as in the interest regression. However, the 
estimates are insignificant but consistently positive across all model variants. Note, however, that 
the insignificant result of the waiting list variables may be explained to some extent by the fact 
that this question contains a much smaller sample than in the interest regression (because of the 
                                                 
24 The fraction of smokers in the sample is a little more than 23 per cent. The number of sporadic smokers is around 
11 per cent. Comparable numbers reported by Statistics Norway for the period 2003–2007 are 25 and 11 per cent. 
Thus, the sample means mirror the national numbers quite accurately. 
25 Stability is also confirmed when both the smoking and age dummies are removed from the regression (not 
reported). 
26 The price that was shown to the respondent was given in NOK. Using the price directly in the regression produces 
very small estimates of κ , from zero to the third decimal point. Therefore, I scale down all prices by a factor of 
10 000. This rescaling does not, of course, affect the other estimates, but increases the price estimate, which makes it 
easier to compare across the models. 
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restriction that only those who had some interest in the insurance participated in the insurance 
tariff test). 
As expected, the price of the insurance affects the preference for insurance negatively. 
Note that the statistical significance of the price is affected by the inclusion of the age covariates, 
which is consistent with the presence of collinearity. 
The overall result is in close correspondence with the interest question and the insurance 
tariff test. Moreover, all the results are in line with what one would expect intuitively. This is a 
reassuring feature considering that the insurance tariff test was presented to a limited set of 
respondents (a potential selection problem) and that prices are highly collinear with age. 
 
c) Treatment insurance ownership 
In light of the results presented above, it is of great interest to analyse the ownership rates 
for both privately purchased and employer-provided insurance. Because ownership represents 
real demand, it is of particular importance to check the consistency between the ownership 
regressions and the results presented above. 
All the results shown above differ from a model for an individual buyer. However, as 
shown in Section 3, substantial market growth in the latter years has come through employer-
provided insurance. The demand for employer-provided insurance might be driven by factors 
other than demand for individual insurance. For example, treatment queues in a county might 
matter less for a firm that operates in several counties. Moreover, workplace characteristics such 
as the average age of the workforce, how risky the firm sector is, the gender composition within a 
firm and the profit level of the firm may all be important characteristics that are, unfortunately, 
unobservable in the data. 
A simple perspective is to assume that the employer acts on behalf of the employees’ 
preferences. If this were the case, then one would expect that the theoretical predictions and 
empirical findings elaborated above should also be valid for holdings of employer-provided 
insurance. However, it is quite likely that demand for employer-provided insurance is dependent 
on workplace characteristics as well. For example, the earned income of an individual is likely to 
be correlated positively with the profits of the employer. Thus, it is likely that high-wage people 
work in firms that have high profits. Despite the potential for omitted variable bias, I believe it is 
interesting to present results for both private insurance and employer-provided insurance. 
However, in the discussion I focus primarily on the regression results considering private 
treatment insurance. 
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Table 6 below shows the regression results. The first column depicts the results for 
privately owned insurance. The second column looks at employer-provided insurance and the 
third shows the parameter estimates where both individual and employer-provided insurance are 
included. Note that those who had employer-provided insurance are removed in the analysis of 
private insurance. Likewise, those who have private insurance are excluded in the analysis of 
employer-provided insurance. 
 
............………………………..TABLE 6……………………………….......... 
 
Almost all of our earlier results are confirmed in column 1 of Table 6. Of particular 
interest is that both waiting list variables have the correct sign and with statistical significance at 
the 5 per cent level for privately bought insurance. Consistent with the interest and insurance 
tariff test, smokers are significantly more likely to possess treatment insurance, independent of 
whether it is employer-provided or private. The third consistent and statistically significant result 
is that penetration of this insurance increases with income. 
8. Discussion 
The results presented in this paper, taken together, indicate that queues in the public 
health care system do have an effect on the demand for treatment insurance. First, for privately 
bought insurance, the relation between queues and demand is statistically significant but its 
economic significance is rather small.Second, it is likely that queues affect the demand for private 
insurances and employer-provided insurances differently. It is quite easy to find arguments for 
why county-specific queues are important for the individual decision (people want to be treated 
close to their friends and family), while these arguments are less convincing when it comes to 
employer-provided insurance. For employers, who often operate across county boundaries, the 
national level of queues might be of more importance than at the county-specific level. Such a 
story is consistent with the results presented here, where I find a quite robust association between 
queues and private demand while this association is not present for employer-provided insurance. 
A consistent finding across the different empirical specifications above is that smokers 
are more inclined to acquire this type of insurance. Why? One interpretation of the significant 
effect of smoking is that smokers assess the probability of requiring the insurance as higher than 
do non-smokers. Another possibility is that smokers possess higher risk aversion than non-
smokers. However, it is well documented that smokers are less risk averse than non-smokers; see, 
for example, Barsky et al. (1997) or Aarbu and Schroyen (2009). Thus, if the probability of 
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requiring treatment is equal across smoking status and if risk aversion is lower among smokers, 
then smokers should be less interested, not higher as found here. Therefore, it makes more sense 
to argue that smokers believe that they will use the insurance with a higher probability than non-
smokers and that this effect dominates the possible risk-aversion effect. Note also that their 
higher willingness to pay more than offsets the higher premium charged by the insurance 
company.There are several reasons why smokers may have a higher assessment of their 
probability of using the insurance than non-smokers. One reason might be poorer average health 
among smokers than for non-smokers, which is confirmed by Lundborg (2007). One should 
expect, however, that the insurance providers know this and therefore avoid this possible anti-
selection through higher premiums for smokers. However, in immature and thin markets, as I 
analyse here, it may be difficult to set actuarially correct premiums because providers typically do 
not have enough experience data to set correct premiums. This may explain the quite large effect 
from smoking both in the insurance tariff test and for the possession of insurance. 
Another possible reason is that smoking-related illnesses are prioritized lower in the 
public health care system than non-smoking-related illnesses. A third possibility is social 
stigmatization of smokers, which can indirectly affect the allocation of resources in the public 
health care system. For example, most of us are acquainted with warning signs on tobacco 
products, such as public-sponsored health campaigns against smoking and similar health debates 
in the media. Over time, these campaigns can cause social stigmatization of smokers. This effect 
can lead to higher interest and penetration of treatment insurance among this group if, for 
example, smokers are somewhat anxious about not being prioritized in the public health care 
system.27 
In the ownership regressions, I find a strong association between employer-provided 
insurance and smoking habit. This association might be driven by workplace characteristics—
characteristics that are unobservable to us. The results of Viscusi and Hersch (2001) point 
towards a connection between risky occupations and smoking. Lundborg (2007), using Swedish 
register data, provides direct evidence on a link between smoking and sickness absence. He finds 
that smokers are absent for a little more than 10 days a year more than non-smokers. 
Conditionally, controlling for risk selection, the estimate is a little more than seven days. Then, 
firms with a large fraction of smokers might on average face more problems with sick leave and 
                                                 
27 One common illness caused by smoking is arteriosclerosis. In cases where this causes heart failure or other similar 
severe states, the public health care system is of course immediately available. However, for milder illnesses such as, 
for example, arteriosclerosis in the legs, waiting time can be justified and waiting time will be high if resources for 
habit-related illnesses are scarce. 
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this may explain the effect of smoking on employer-provided insurance. While one can argue that 
this effect might be relevant in a small immature market where knowledge of the risk landscape is 
scarce (this case), the argument is less convincing in a mature market. In the latter situation, 
insurance prices should reflect differences in accident probability, and selection effects from 
observable and relevant underwriting variables should not be present. 
It is also worthwhile to note that the self-employed are significantly and consistently more 
interested in the insurance than employees. It is quite likely that one reason for this is that the 
compensation rules for sickness absence are inferior compared with sickness benefits for wage 
earners. In Norway, a wage earner receives 100 per cent of his/her wage starting from the first 
sick day, while a self-employed person receives only 65 per cent of his/her income from the 16th 
day of the sickness spell. Moreover, a self-employed person will probably carry costs that extend 
the direct monetary loss described above. For example, the self-employed can experience 
contract losses or other long-term consequences of being away from work while sick. 
The effect of education on the demand for treatment insurance is somewhat puzzling. 
First, it is of opposite sign compared with the findings in Besley et al. (1999). Second, on average, 
highly educated people earn more than non-educated people. Thus, one should search for more 
country-specific reasons in explaining the education effect found here. One such reason is the 
fact that the public sector is a major employer of highly educated people. Figures from the 
Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV) show that more than 50 per cent of those 
who have education above the four-year university level are employed in public administration 
(16.3 per cent), education (18.3 per cent) or health and social services (16.2 per cent).28 Because 
health care is provided by the public sector, employees in the public sector are not provided with 
this kind of insurance, as this would undermine the whole idea of universal public health care. 
Therefore, the connection between education level and public sector employment might be an 
explanation for the strong negative effect of education found above. One obvious control would 
be to interact working sector with education in the regression. Unfortunately, the survey data set 
does not have any information about working sector. 
I find mixed evidence for how age affects demand. Some evidence is found, however, 
that penetration of employer-provided insurance decreases with age. A study by Løvås et. al 
(2007) provides some support for this finding. They find that firms with a young work force are 
more likely to provide their employees with treatment insurance. 
                                                 
28 See www.nav.no/page?id=1073743228, accessed 24th August 2009. Both the Education Sector and the Health 
and Social Services sector consist almost entirely of public entities. 
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Along the same reasoning, the highly significant higher probability of males being 
provided with employer-provided insurance could be explained by the fact, for example, that 
males are more frequently represented in risky occupations, that males more often take on 
leadership positions or that males are more likely to work in the private sector than females. 
However, to investigate these issues further, one needs richer data that connect employees and 
employers and combine such data with insurance information. Such an exercise remains for 
future research. 
9. Concluding remarks and future research avenues 
By utilizing information from a unique survey data set containing the results of an interest 
question, an insurance tariff test and ownership of insurance, a consistent demand pattern for 
treatment insurance is found. For privately bought insurance, I find that county specific waiting 
lists affect the demand, while I cannot provide such evidence for employer provided insurance. 
Moreover, smokers express strong preferences for treatment insurance and theay are also more 
likely to own this type of insurance. The likelihood of acquiring this insurance increases with 
income, as expected. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that investigates 
empirically the relation between queues in public health care and private treatment insurance 
demand within a Scandinavian context. 
Because of scarce market data, more research in this area is needed. For example, one 
needs more knowledge regarding employer-provided insurance. This paper has shown that high-
income individuals and smokers are more likely to own employer-provided insurance. However, 
because of the absence of workplace characteristics, the relationship between ownership of 
employer-provided insurance, firm characteristics and individual characteristics cannot be 
answered here. 
Moreover, that smokers are more likely to acquire this type of insurance may be an 
indication of a potential information problem in this market. However, to map this information 
problem in more detail, one needs both tariff and claims data combined with socio-economic 
information. Thus, more knowledge about demand patterns for employer-provided insurance 
and explorations of adverse selection problems, using contract-level data, are fruitful avenues for 
future research. 
Knowledge about the interaction between public and private alternatives is also important 
in understanding the transformation of the welfare state. How large can the privately provided 
health care sector grow before it threatens the (Nordic) principle of free of charge universal 
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health care? The latter question is particularly important to bear in mind in light of the rapid 
growth of the privately provided health care documented in this paper. 
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Tables and diagrams 
Table 1. Mean waiting times in days after referral for treated patients: somatic treatment 
only 
 Mean waiting time in days 1998–2004 Mean waiting time in days 2004–2005
County 
103.81 68.78 Østfold 
Akershus 87.25 68.93 
Oslo 73.22 60.40 
Hedmark 87.48 66.48 
Oppland 90.44 66.92 
Buskerud 89.94 66.66 
Vestfold 83.36 64.32 
Telemark 91.41 65.44 
Aust-Agder 80.20 78.18 
Vest-Agder 84.21 69.52 
Rogaland 100.46 78.58 
Hordaland 97.78 126.47 
Sogn & Fjordane 91.83 82.76 
Møre & Romsdal 102.65 68.28 
Sør-Trøndelag 103.08 80.55 
Nord-Trøndelag 92.63 70.62 
Nordland 91.47 75.28 
Troms 95.94 76.28 
Finnmark 97.81 88.06 
All 90.98 75.71 
Source: Norwegian patient register, extracted from www.npr.no July 2007. 
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Diagram 1. The evolution of private treatment insurance in Norway, 2003 to 2008. 
 Number of insured. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: FNH and various press sources.29 
 
                                                 
29 See www.aftenposten.no/jobb/article959854.ece, http://www.dagensmedisin.no/nyheter/2006/06/09/kraftig-
vekst-i-helseforsik/index.xml ,www.dagensmedisin.no/nyheter/2008/08/13/benytter-seg-mer-av-helsef/index.xml 
(all links in Norwegian) 
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Table 2. Possession of treatment insurance 
 
 Privately bought Employer provided No insurance Sum 
Number of 
observations 
78 138 1588 1804 
Fractions 0.04 0.08 0.88 1 
 
 32
Table 3. Descriptive statistics: possession of treatment insurance across SES 
 
 
Privately bought Treatment insurance 
through employer 
Do not have insurance 
Age category 
0.04 0.11 0.85 30–34 
35–39 0.07 0.09 0.84 
40–44 0.06 0.07 0.87 
45–49 0.03 0.06 0.91 
50–54 0.03 0.06 0.91 
Smoking habit 
0.06 0.10 0.84 Yes, daily 
Sporadically 0.04 0.07 0.88 
No, not at all 0.04 0.07 0.89 
Income 
0.04 0.04 0.91 Up to 299K 
300K–599K 0.04 0.09 0.87 
Over 600K 0.06 0.08 0.86 
Gender 
0.04 0.09 0.87 Male 
Female 0.04 0.06 0.90 
Education 
0.02 0.07 0.90 Primary school 
High school 0.05 0.09 0.86 
Higher education 0.04 0.07 0.89 
Occupation 0.05 0.10 0.85 
Blue collar 
White collar 0.05 0.10 0.84 
Leading position white 
collar 0.03 0.06 0.91 
Other 0.05 0.05 0.90 
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Privately bought Treatment insurance 
through employer 
Do not have insurance 
Civil status 
0.04 0.08 0.88 Married/Partner 
Other 0.04 0.07 0.89 
Number in household 
0.04 0.08 0.87 Single household 
More than one 0.04 0.08 0.88 
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Table 4. Maximum likelihood estimates: expressed interest in a completely specified 
treatment insurance. Ordered probit. Dependent variable is stated interest from 
“Highly interesting”, to “Interesting”, “Somewhat interesting”, and “Not interesting”. 
 
 
Estimate 
(Std Err) 
Intercept 1 –1.15*** 
(.345) 
Intercept 2 –0.1278 
(.344) 
Intercept 3 0.915*** 
(.344) 
Referrals pending more than three months: fraction of 
county population 
0.022** 
(.011) 
Days from referral to treatment: pended more than 90 
days (mean within each county) 
–0.0000 
(.000) 
Male –0.0055 
(.054) 
Daily smoker 0.162** 
(.064) 
Sporadic smoker 0.141* 
(.083) 
35–39 0.0830 
(.082) 
40–44 –.134* 
(.080) 
45–49 –0.0958 
(.079) 
50–54 –.262*** 
(.080) 
University education –.349*** 
(.056) 
Medium income –0.0963 
(.098) 
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Estimate 
(Std Err) 
High income 0.0848 
(.118) 
Highest income 0.326* 
(.172) 
Blue collar  0.0829 
(.067) 
Self employed 0.186** 
(.093) 
 
 
Additional statistics 
Log likelihood –2209.8506 
N (n1,n2,n3,n4) 1723(215,535,631,342) 
Score test for equal slopes (Pr>ChiSq) 0.4986 
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Table 5. Parameter estimates: an insurance tariff test for completely specified treatment 
insurance. Ordered probit estimation of stated likelihood for buying treatment 
insurance at a given price. Possible responses to the question were “highly likely”, 
“likely”, “somewhat unlikely” or “not likely at all”. 
 
Two age 
dummies 
One age 
dummy 
No age 
dummies 
 
Estimate 
(Std Err) 
Estimate 
(Std Err) 
Estimate 
(Std Err) 
Intercept 1 –1.13*** 
(.434) 
–1.10** 
(.432) 
–1.15*** 
(.417) 
Intercept 2  0.1647 
(.433) 
0.1943 
(.431) 
0.1423 
(.415) 
Intercept 3 1.644*** 
(.435) 
1.673*** 
(.433) 
1.621*** 
(.417) 
Referrals pending more than 3 months: fraction of county population 0.00536 
(.013) 
0.00545 
(.013) 
0.00559 
(.013) 
Days from referral to treatment: pended more than 90 days (mean 
within each county) 
0.000075 
(.001) 
0.000070 
(.001) 
0.000068 
(.001) 
Male –0.0122 
(.064) 
–0.00996 
(.064) 
–0.00873 
(.064) 
Smoker 0.251*** 
(.092) 
0.268*** 
(.088) 
0.250*** 
(.077) 
Sporadic smoker 0.1403 
(.097) 
0.1417 
(.097) 
0.1435 
(.097) 
Age group 40–44 –0.0605 
(.095) 
: : 
Age group 45–54 –0.00201 
(.161) 
0.0589 
(.129) 
: 
University education –.225*** 
(.066) 
–.219*** 
(.066) 
–.219*** 
(.066) 
Middle income 0.0643 
(.113) 
0.0593 
(.113) 
0.0573 
(.113) 
High income 0.331** 
(.137) 
0.325** 
(.136) 
0.323** 
(.136) 
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Two age 
dummies 
One age 
dummy 
No age 
dummies 
 
Estimate 
(Std Err) 
Estimate 
(Std Err) 
Estimate 
(Std Err) 
Highest income 0.737*** 
(.201) 
0.732*** 
(.201) 
0.730*** 
(.201) 
Blue collar 0.0942 
(.078) 
0.0968 
(.078) 
0.0964 
(.078) 
Self employed 0.341*** 
(.106) 
0.342*** 
(.106) 
0.342*** 
(.106) 
Price –2.942* 
(1.506) 
–3.393** 
(1.328) 
–2.864*** 
(0.643) 
 
Additional statistics 
Log likelihood  –1455.9 (column 1) 
–1456.1 (column 2) 
–1456.2 (column 3) 
N (n1,n2,n3,n4) 1285 (118,484,571,112) 
Score test for equal slopes (Pr>ChiSq) 0.1350 (column 1) 
0.0941 (column 2) 
0.0693 (column 3) 
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Table 6. Parameter estimates: possession of treatment insurance 
Probit models. The dependent variable coded 1 if the respondent has insurance, zero otherwise. 
 
Privately bought 
insurance 
Employer-provided 
insurance 
Both private and 
employer provided 
 
Estimate 
(Std Err) 
Estimate 
(Std Err) 
Estimate 
(Std Err) 
Constant –4.47*** 
(.895) 
–2.12*** 
(.717) 
–2.82*** 
(.613) 
Referrals pending more than three months: 
fraction of county population 
0.050** 
(.024) 
0.0095 
(.024) 
0.0273 
(.020) 
Days from referral to treatment: pended more 
than 90 days (mean within each county) 
0.003** 
(.001) 
0.0003 
(.001) 
0.002* 
(.001) 
Male –0.0423 
(.121) 
0.198* 
(.102) 
0.1229 
(.086) 
Daily smoker 0.261* 
(.133) 
0.259** 
(.113) 
0.274*** 
(.095) 
Sporadic smoker 0.0936 
(.184) 
0.0404 
(.157) 
0.0363 
(.133) 
35–39 –0.2381 
(.199) 
–.315** 
(.151) 
–.317** 
(.133) 
40–44 –0.2769 
(.200) 
–.336** 
(.149) 
–.335** 
(.132) 
45–49 0.1873 
(.176) 
–.318** 
(.152) 
–0.0753 
(.126) 
50–54 0.2058 
(.180) 
–0.0812 
(.148) 
0.0450 
(.127) 
University education –0.0135 
(.127) 
–0.0836 
(.105) 
–0.0670 
(.090) 
Medium income 0.1661 
(.230) 
0.542** 
(.236) 
0.420** 
(.182) 
High income 0.3937 
(.268) 
0.2883 
(.278) 
0.355* 
(.214) 
Highest income 0.966*** 
(.337) 
1.018*** 
(.341) 
1.118*** 
(.264) 
 39
 
Privately bought 
insurance 
Employer-provided 
insurance 
Both private and 
employer provided 
 
Estimate 
(Std Err) 
Estimate 
(Std Err) 
Estimate 
(Std Err) 
Blue collar  0.0785 
(.148) 
0.0972 
(.113) 
0.0923 
(.101) 
Self employed 0.1445 
(.188) 
-- –0.2254 
(.161) 
 
 
Additional statistics 
 
Privately bought insurance 
Employer-provided 
insurance 
Both private and employer 
provided 
Log likelihood –279.37 –411.21 –594.35 
N (n1,n0) 1569 (74,1495) 1481 (125,1356) 1698 (203,1495) 
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Appendix 1: Derivation of equations (2) and (4) and the derivative 
a
P
∂
∂ *  
 
The expected utility of an uninsured person (where I for convenience suppress the 
subscript i) is 
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The exact expression for the second-order Taylor expansion around ),( maTa +  is 
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which gives equation (2). 
 
If the person is insured then expected utility is 
 
),( PmaTavEv −+= . 
 
The first-order Taylor expansion around ),( maTa +  gives 
 
PvmaTavmaTPmaTvmaTav mm −+=−−−−++ ),())((),( , 
 
which gives equation (4). 
 
The derivative 
a
P
∂
∂ *  is 
 
 
 41
.)(),(
2
1)),(1(
),()(),(
2
1
2
2
eawπ
a
maTaRmaTaRwπ
wπmaTaReawπ
a
maTaRwπ
a
a
a
a
+∂
+∂+++
=+++∂
+∂+
 
The definition of Ra is 
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For convenience, I drop the functional argument ),( maTa +  from here. Taking the 
derivative of the above expression gives 
 
(a1) ]][][[ 2
m
mmmammmmmmmama
v
TvvvTvvv
a
R +−+−=∂
∂ . 
 
By symmetry, mav  = amv . By Roy’s identity ma lvv −= , where l is the demand for leisure 
and mv  is marginal utility of wealth. Thus, we have 
 
(a2) 
[ ] mmmmmma lvlvlvmv −−=−∂
∂= . 
 
Furthermore, using the symmetry of the derivatives and Roy’s identity, one obtains 
 
(a3) 
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∂= 2][
.
 
 
Substituting (a2) and (a3) into (a1) gives 
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which can be simplified further to 
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where aR  and aP  is absolute risk aversion and absolute prudence, defined as 
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This implies 
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Define labour supply as lTL −≡ . From this identity, mm lL −=  and mmmm lL −= . 
 
Substituting these into (a4) gives 
 
(a5) 2)(])([
2
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∂ ππ . 
 
The term LPRR aaa )( −  is the income effect connected to the wage increase. 
Furthermore, note that L
m
RLPRR aaaa ∂
∂=− )( . It is reasonable to assume that absolute risk 
aversion decreases in income. Under this assumption: 0<∂
∂ L
m
Ra . Moreover, 0<mL  given that 
leisure is a normal good. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that 0>mmL  because the marginal 
demand for leisure declines when leisure reaches the time limit T.30 To sum up, the second term 
in (a5) is negative. Because the second term, however, is a second-order effect it is likely that it 
will be dominated by the first term in (a5), which leads to the conclusion that 
a
P
∂
∂  is most likely 
positive. 
                                                 
30 This, however, does not rule out the possibility that mmL  in some segments between zero and T is less than zero. 
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Appendix 2: Description of explanatory variables 
 
Public waiting lists 
There are several alternatives that can be used as instruments for the importance of 
waiting lists on treatment insurance ownership. Besley et al. (1999) use both spending measures 
and waiting list measures and find that only long-term waiting lists are significant. I have access to 
waiting list data at the county level, but not spending data. Two waiting list measures are used. 
The first is the number of referrals as a percentage of county population given that the referrals 
pended more than three months. This quantity will grow when the number of new referrals 
exceeds the number of completed cases and will therefore reflect changes in both supply and 
demand factors. Whatever the reason, whenever private treatment insurance implies faster 
treatment within an acceptable distance from the place of residence, one should expect feeding 
effects from pending referrals to treatment insurance purchases. The other measure is the mean 
waiting time in days for completed referrals given that it has pended for at least 90 days. The last 
measure captures the severity of completed waiting spells. Table A2. 1 shows descriptive statistics 
for these two variables. 
 
Table A2. 1. Waiting list variables: mean over the period 1998–2001 
Variable Mean Std Dev Max Min 
Fraction of referrals pending more than three months as 
a percentage of county population 
9.427 2.372 13.81 5.561 
Mean waiting time in days for completed referrals: 
pended for at least 90 days 
665.9 56.51 764.2 487.5 
 
Age and smoking habits 
I include both smoking habit and age category in the regressions below. The age 
information available here is divided into the following categories: 30–35, 36–40, 41–45, 46–50 
and 51–54. These categories are represented through dummies, where the 30–35 category is used 
as the reference category. Moreover, a dummy for permanent smokers and for sporadic smokers 
are included. Non-smokers are the reference group. 
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Personal characteristics 
As shown in the theoretical section, individual income is expected to affect the decision 
to insure. Besley et al. (1999) show that under mild assumptions one would expect sorting into 
private treatment insurance by income. I define three income categories. The lowest income 
category is from zero to 300 000 kroner, the middle-income category ranges from 300 000 to 600 
000, and the high income category is defined as individuals with an annual income higher than 
600 000. I introduce a dummy for the middle and high-income group leaving the low-income 
group as a reference. 
 
Occupational characteristics and education 
Characteristics that might reveal information about underlying firm characteristics are 
captured by three dummy variables. First, a dummy for blue-collar workers that takes the value of 
one if occupation “blue collar” is observed. Second, I construct a similar dummy for the self-
employed. The reference category is white-collar respondents. Third, I define a dummy that 
represents university education. Finally, a dummy that takes the value 1 if a male is observed 
represents the gender effect. 
 
 45
Appendix 3: Estimation of the latent model given in equation (8) 
Free variance and price parameter set equal to 1 
 
Recall that equation (8) was given by ** ' εXβPU ++−= . Recall also that the responses 
were ordered as follows: “Highly likely” (HL), “Likely” (L), “Unlikely” (UL), and “Not likely at 
all” (NL). These responses can be denoted by ),,,( HLLULNLy∈ . 
 
The response probabilities can be written as 
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These probabilities lead to the likelihood function 
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where 4,3,2,1, =kyk  takes the value 1 if the response is in category k and zero otherwise. The 
maximum likelihood estimates of the model with no age dummies are given in the table below. If 
one divides the parameter estimates by the estimated 
^
σ , it is easy to verify that these are exactly 
equal to the results obtained in column 3 of Table 5. 
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Table A3.1 Model equivalent to model in third column in Table 5, but with fixed price 
parameter instead of fixed variance. Ordered probit estimation of stated likelihood of buying 
treatment insurance for a given price.  
 Parameter estimates for model with fixed 
price parameter (set to 1) and freely 
estimated σ . No age dummies. 
Intercept 1 –.402** 
(.194) 
Intercept 2  0.04969 
(.143) 
Intercept 3 0.566*** 
(.162) 
Referrals pending more than three months: fraction of county population 0.001953 
(.005) 
Days from referral to treatment: pended more than 90 days (mean within 
each county) 
0.000024 
(.000) 
Male –0.00305 
(.022) 
Smoker 0.087*** 
(.028) 
Sporadic smoker 0.05016 
(.036) 
University education –.076*** 
(.028) 
Middle income 0.02001 
(.039) 
High income 0.113** 
(.052) 
Highest income 0.255*** 
(.087) 
Blue collar 0.03367 
(.029) 
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Self employed 0.120*** 
(.044) 
^
σ  
0.349*** 
(.079) 
Log likelihood –1456.2 
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